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1  | INTRODUC TION
On the 30th of January 2020, the World Health Organization de-
clared the growing COVID- 19 outbreak a Public Health Emergency 
of International Concern (WHO, 2020). Preventing and slowing 
the spread of the virus, which at the time of writing has claimed 
more than 3.2 million lives, has become a priority for policy- makers 
around the globe (Hale et al., 2020; WHO, 2021). In recent reviews, 
social and behavioral scientists have highlighted the critical role of 
research in (a) informing efforts to communicate evidence regard-
ing the virus (Blastland et al., 2020), (b) counter misinformation (van 
der Linden et al., 2020), and (c) encourage both support for policies 
and the adoption of preventative behaviors (Van Bavel et al., 2020). 
These efforts are critical for an effective response to pandemics in 
terms of promoting health protecting actions directly (e.g., social 
distancing, vaccination), but also in combatting misinformation and 
misperceptions which may lead people to reject such actions. This 
can ultimately lead to the prevention of deaths from COVID- 19, as 
well as expediting a return to economic and social normalcy (Flaxman 
et al., 2020; Lytras & Tsiodras, 2020). Among the strategies outlined 
by Van Bavel et al. (2020), the communication of scientific norms 
was noted as one approach to shifting beliefs and behavior, draw-
ing on the credibility of the scientific community (see also, Rutjens 
et al., 2021). Although this remains untested in the context of the 
COVID- 19 outbreak, there is a growing body of evidence that com-
munication of scientific agreement can shift personal beliefs, and 
policy support, across a range of scientific domains. This notion is 
captured by the Gateway Belief Model (GBM).
1.1 | The Gateway Belief Model
The GBM (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, et al., 2015; van der Linden 
et al., 2019) is a dual- process theory of attitude change that posits 
a two- stage mediational process where perceptions of scientific 
consensus act as a key “gateway cognition” to influencing personal 
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Abstract
The Gateway Belief Model (GBM) places perception of a scientific consensus as a 
key “gateway cognition” with cascading effects on personal beliefs, concern, and ul-
timately support for public policies. However, few studies seeking to evaluate and 
extend the model have followed the specification and design of the GBM as originally 
outlined. We present a more complete test of the theoretical model in a novel domain: 
the COVID- 19 pandemic. In a large multi- country correlational study (N = 7,206) we 
report that, as hypothesized by the model, perceptions of scientific consensus re-
garding the threat of COVID- 19 predict personal attitudes toward threat and worry 
over the virus, which are in turn positively associated with support for mitigation 
policies. We also find causal support for the model in a large pre- registered survey 
experiment (N = 1,856): experimentally induced increases in perceived consensus 
have an indirect effect on changes in policy support mediated via changes in personal 
agreement with the consensus. Implications for the role of expert consensus in sci-
ence communication are discussed.
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agreement with scientific claims which in turn predict support 
for related policies. The GBM has been applied to a diverse set of 
contested issues, including genetically modified (GM) organisms 
(Dixon, 2016; Kerr & Wilson, 2018; Kobayashi, 2021), vaccination 
(van der Linden, Clarke, et al., 2015), Brexit (Harris et al., 2019), vi-
tamin supplements (Kobayashi, 2018), and climate change (Bolsen & 
Druckman, 2018; van der Linden, Leiserowitz, et al., 2015; van der 
Linden et al., 2019). Such studies have formed the basis of commu-
nication campaigns (Goldberg, van der Linden, Ballew, et al., 2019) 
and offer greater insights into how perceptions of expert agreement 
inform individuals' beliefs about a wide range socially relevant and 
publicly debated issues.
The GBM builds on theory derived from established dual- process 
models of persuasion such as the Elaboration Likelihood Model and 
Heuristic- Systematic model (van der Linden, 2021). Within such mod-
els, heuristics— rules of thumb— are applied as mental shortcuts to re-
duce cognitive effort. Two particular heuristics are especially relevant 
in the context of the GBM: sources which are deemed more credible 
are more persuasive (the credibility heuristic; experts can be trusted) as 
are claims which supported by a majority of the group (the consensus 
heuristic; consensus implies correctness). The impact of consensus in-
formation (e.g., “97% of experts think that X”) is considered in the light 
of social influence research, with scientific consensus representing 
“informational influence” (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955) or a descriptive 
social norm (Cialdini, 2007) within a broadly trusted group of experts 
(Funk et al., 2020; van der Linden, 2021). As noted by Cialdini and col-
leagues, “audiences are powerfully influenced by the combined judg-
ment of multiple experts” (Cialdini et al., 2015, p. 23). As a heuristic, 
this makes good sense, people often favor expert over regular crowds 
when forming judgments under uncertainty, which helps people tap 
collective wisdom fast and efficiently (Mannes et al., 2014).
Scientific consensus cues can also spread in social networks 
via interpersonal discussion with friends and family (Goldberg, van 
der Linden, Maibach, et al., 2019). This is important because just 
as people often misperceive social consensus, for example, around 
binge drinking (Prentice & Miller, 1993) and polarization (Van Boven 
et al., 2018), so too do people misperceive the scientific consensus 
on a range of issues, from climate change to vaccination (Pew, 2015). 
Correcting people's perception of the norm often leads to subse-
quent (smaller) changes in private attitudes and behavior (Tankard 
& Paluck, 2016). Targeting second- order normative beliefs (i.e., 
beliefs about what other people believe) has revealed potential in 
changing first- order beliefs (i.e., personal beliefs; Goldberg, van der 
Linden, Maibach, et al., 2019; Mildenberger & Tingley, 2019). The 
GBM leverages norm perception as a vehicle for change in a similar 
manner: revealing the consensus among experts can be a power-
ful strategy to align people's perception of the norm with the actual 
scientific norm resulting in positive downstream consequences on 
private attitudes and policy support (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; van 
der Linden, Leiserowitz, et al., 2015; van der Linden et al., 2019).
In the original GBM, van der Linden, Leiserowitz, et al. (2015) out-
line two possible mediators of the effect of consensus perceptions on 
policy support: worry, capturing an affective component; and personal 
belief or agreement, representing a cognitive pathway. Although the 
GBM has been applied in a range of domains, most deviate from van 
der Linden, Leiserowitz, et al.'s (2015) original model. For example, 
many tests of the GBM in different contexts have only examined the 
role of perceived consensus as a mediator of the effect of a message 
on personal agreement with the consensus claim (Dixon et al., 2015; 
Kerr & Wilson, 2018). Fewer studies have examined policy support as 
an outcome and those that do tend to focus only on personal agree-
ment as a mediator, i.e., they do not include worry as a further path 
by which perceived consensus can affect policy attitudes (e.g., Bolsen 
& Druckman, 2018). This omission is not trivial, as the GBM posits 
that both cognitive (personal agreement with consensus position) and 
affective (worry) elements mediate the effect of perceived consensus 
on policy support. In other words, how concerned people are and how 
much they worry about an issue explains additional variance, over and 
above awareness of a problem, in predicting support for mitigation 
policies across a range of domains (Goldberg, Gustafson, et al., 2020; 
Huang & Yang, 2018; Salvaggio et al., 2014).
Accordingly, a recent review has called for more comprehensive 
and direct confirmatory tests of the GBM (van der Linden, 2021). 
The pandemic presents a large scale, socially relevant phenomenon 
of much concern to the general public (Dryhurst et al., 2020) and is 
the focus of a number of publicly debated policies which aim to mit-
igate its impact (Balmford et al., 2020). Yet, little is currently known 
about the general public's perceptions of scientific agreement re-
garding the overall threat of COVID- 19 and how this relates to their 
personal beliefs and attitudes about the pandemic. This is especially 
relevant in light of current debates about the politicization of science 
(Druckman, 2017) and whether exposure to evidence can cause be-
lief polarization (Kahan et al., 2011; Kobayashi, 2018; van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, & Maibach, 2017). These studies will therefore provide 
novel insights into how expert agreement shapes public attitudes 
toward the coronavirus and policies aimed at mitigating its spread.
1.2 | Current studies
In Study 1 we apply the GBM to beliefs about the threat posed by 
the coronavirus during the initial stages of the outbreak (March– 
May, 2020), as the scientific community worked to build a greater 
understanding of the virus and its potential impacts. This timing is 
important as it offers insight into how perception of expert consen-
sus relates to personal belief and policy support regarding a novel, 
but highly salient scientific issue. This is in contrast to many of the 
prior issues to which the GBM has been applied that have been the 
subject of scientific research and public debate for decades (e.g., 
climate change, GM food, and vaccination). We ask: does perception 
of a scientific consensus predict personal agreement that COVID is 
a public health emergency, and worry over the virus? And do these 
constructs subsequently predict support for policies intended to 
curtail its spread?
There are number of ways we could operationalize perceptions 
of scientific consensus and personal agreement regarding the threat 
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posed by the COVID- 19 pandemic. In the current studies we opted 
to use the wording of the WHO, which declared COVID- 19 to be 
a “Public Health Emergency of International Concern” (PHEIC) in 
January 2020 (WHO, 2020). This technical definition captures an 
overall perception of the virus as a threat and aligns with the actual 
language used by the scientific community in the lead up to WHO 
declaration (Science Media Centre, 2020). This approach also aligns 
with previous work on the GBM in the context of climate change in 
that the focal claim is descriptive, that is, it does not convey agree-
ment about what should be done, only that there is agreement on the 
existence of a challenge to be addressed (e.g., climate change; van 
der Linden et al., 2019).
In Study 1 we present a test of the GBM using cross- sectional 
data. Following from the GBM, we hypothesize that perceptions of 
scientific consensus regarding the threat posed by COVID- 19 will 
be associated with personal agreement with the consensus position 
and worry over COVID- 19. We also hypothesize that, perceptions of 
scientific consensus will have a positive, indirect effect on support 
for policies intended to mitigate the spread of the virus mediated via 
personal agreement and worry.
In Study 2 we undertake a pre- registered experimental test of 
the causal paths assumed in the Study 1 model. We compare the 
effects of a high (97%) or low (60%) consensus message outlining 
the level of scientific agreement regarding COVID- 19's designation 
as a PHEIC. Following from van der Linden et al.'s (2019) specifica-
tion of the GBM, we expect that high and low consensus messages 
will respectively increase or decrease perceived scientific consensus 
and that these shifts will in turn predict subsequent, smaller changes 
in personal agreement and worry, which in turn predict changes in 
policy support. Specifically, we hypothesize that shifts in perceived 
consensus will have an indirect effect on changes in policy support, 




Data for this study were collected as part of a larger series of surveys 
investigating a range of COVID- related attitudes and risk percep-
tions (see Dryhurst et al., 2020; Roozenbeek et al., 2020). We re-
cruited participants in several countries taking different approaches 
to managing the pandemic: UK, US, Spain, Mexico, and Ireland. We 
noted that at the time of data collection, all countries had in place 
some form of “stay at home” mandate (Hale et al., 2021). Participants 
were primarily recruited through an International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) certified online panel provider (Respondi; re-
spondi.com), using interlocking national quotas to ensure final sam-
ples were matched to population in terms of age and gender. Surveys 
in the UK were conducted at two time points and two additional 
national UK samples were recruited through Prolific (prolific.co), 
with screening quotas for age, gender, and ethnicity to approxi-
mately match the UK population (Prolific, n.d.). For each recruitment 
platform, UK participants who completed a survey were excluded 
from participating in subsequent surveys.1 The survey dates, size 
and demographic profile of each sample are shown in Table 1.
Sample size was determined by resources available in the context 
of the larger COVID- 19 research program. While our primary focus 
is the pooled sample, all individual samples still exceed the sample 
 1We cannot rule out the possibility that some UK participants held both Respondi and 
Prolific accounts and participated on both platforms. We acknowledge this as limitation, 
but also note that, given the size of each platforms' UK participant panel, and the fact 











Total – – 7,206 51.05 44.71 
(15.79)
54.18
Spain Respondi May- 06 700 50.43 46.00 
(15.03)
56.71
Ireland Respondi Apr- 24 700 50.00 45.85 
(16.32)
53.00
Mexico Respondi May- 06 700 51.00 38.61 
(14.21)
75.57
UK Prolific Apr- 09 1,049 50.62 45.16 
(15.63)
56.82
UK Prolific May- 07 1,157 50.73 44.72 
(15.66)
56.53
UK Respondi Apr- 09 1,050 52.00 45.39 
(16.00)
42.29
UK Respondi May- 07 1,150 52.00 45.72 
(15.94)
43.39
US Respondi May- 07 700 51.00 45.03 
(16.08)
59.14
TA B L E  1   Sample details
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size outlined by Fritz and MacKinnon (2007) as adequate to detect a 
mediated effect in which both a and b paths are “small” (by Cohen's 
standards of effect size; equivalent to β = 0.14) at 0.8 power in anal-
yses employing BCa bootstrap intervals as the test of the mediated 
effect (N = 462).
Participants completed the survey on the Qualtrics platform and 
were paid £1.00– £2.79. All participants provided informed consent 
and the study was overseen by the Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee at the University of Cambridge.
2.1.2 | Materials
Participants completed items capturing their perception of scien-
tific agreement on COVID- 19 being a PHEIC (“What percentage of 
medical scientists do you think agree that coronavirus/COVID- 19 
is a Public Health Emergency of International Concern?” Sliding 
scale, 0%– 100%), their own personal agreement with this claim 
[“The COVID- 19 virus is a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern”; Strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5)], their level of 
worry over COVID- 19 [“How worried are you personally about the 
following issues at present?— Coronavirus/COVID- 19”; Not at all wor-
ried (1) to Very worried (7)] and support for a Work from Home 
policy [“I support a government policy requiring all non- essential 
workers to stay at home”; Not at all (1) to Very much (7)]. This par-
ticular policy was selected as it was presented as a key response 
to control the spread of the virus (Acuña- Zegarra et al., 2020; 
Cairney, 2021; Henríquez et al., 2020), was relevant across na-
tional contexts, and supported by evidence at the time of data col-
lection as an effective strategy to reduce non- household contacts 
and control the spread of the virus (Ferguson et al., 2020). Where 
required, survey instruments were translated by a native Spanish 
speaker fluent in English.
Participants in the US, UK, and Ireland samples also answered an 
additional policy item relevant to the local context at the time: “I be-
lieve the current lockdown should continue for at least another 3 weeks”. 
This policy item reflected UK government signaling at the time of 
initial data collection (Hughes, 2020) and was deemed relevant for 
the US and Ireland, where authorities had extended lockdown re-
strictions (BBC, 2020; Quinn, 2020). Results for this measure as a 
dependent outcome were comparable (see Supporting Information, 
Appendix 2).
2.2 | Results
In all countries, the mean perceived level of scientific consen-
sus regarding the severity COVID- 19 was high (Mpooled = 86.21%, 
SD = 16.35; individual country Ms = 82.58%– 90.42%). Mean levels 
of personal agreement (Mpooled = 4.57, SD = 0.81; Ms = 4.39– 4.74), 
worry (Mpooled = 5.85, SD = 1.38; Ms = 5.58– 6.11) and support for 
working from home (Mpooled = 5.77 SD = 1.59; Ms = 4.89– 6.39) were 
also high, with values above the scale mid- point across all samples 
(descriptive results and zero- order correlations are reported in 
Supporting Information, Table S1). We report results for the entire 
pooled sample here but note that the pattern of effects was similar 
across all samples. We draw attention to descriptive differences be-
tween countries where appropriate.
To empirically test the fit of the GBM in relation to COVID- 19 at-
titudes, we constructed a serial mediation model using the R package 
lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) outlined in Figure 1. This approach allows es-
timation of indirect effects via multiple sequential mediators as well 
as combined indirect effects (Hayes, 2017). Perceived consensus is 
positioned as an exogenous variable predicting personal agreement 
and worry, which in turn predicts policy support. As per the origi-
nal GBM (van der Linden, Leiserowitz, et al., 2015), we also include 
a path by which personal agreement predicts worry. Analyses em-
ployed a MLR estimator (robust fit measures reported).
The model fit the pooled data from all samples well (X2(1) = 424.06, 
p < .001; CFI = 0.967; SRMR = 0.039; RMSEA = 0.168, 95CI 
[0.154, 0.181]) and we also report good fit for the model in each 
individual sample (CFIs = 0.942– 0.997; SRMRs = 0.014– 0.049; 
RMSEAs = 0.067– 0.215; see Supporting Information Table S2). We 
note that the RMSEA value is above the commonly accepted crite-
rion of 0.06 (Hu & Bentler, 1999). As noted by Kenny et al. (2015), 
this is typical of models with low degrees of freedom. Kenny and 
colleagues recommend in such cases that a fully saturated model is 
used to estimate regression coefficients. Thus, in Table 2 we report 
the regression coefficients for each path in the saturated model, i.e., 
the paths outlined in Figure 1 and the direct effect of consensus on 
policy support (c).
As shown in Table 2, in the pooled sample we report a signifi-
cant, positive effect of perceived consensus on personal agreement, 
indicating that individuals who perceive greater scientific agreement 
on the threat of COVID- 19 express greater personal agreement that 
pandemic is a public health emergency. Higher perceived consensus 
is also associated with worry over COVID- 19, as is personal agree-
ment. In turn both agreement and worry are associated with greater 
support for a work from home policy.
We report a significant overall combined indirect (i.e., mediated) 
effect of consensus on policy support (β = 0.20, unstandardized 
b = 0.02, 95CI [0.02, 0.02]; bootstrapped (5,000 samples; bias cor-
rected accelerated) confidence intervals do not include zero). This 
F I G U R E  1   Diagram of GBM model in relation to COVID- 19 
attitudes
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represents the sum of effects of consensus mediated by three dif-
ferent paths (outlined in Figure 1): via agreement, via worry, and via 
agreement then worry.
Similarly, when the model is fitted to data from each individual 
sample we find a significant indirect effect of perceived scientific 
consensus on policy support, mediated via personal agreement and 
worry (βs 0.08– 0.41; Table 3, full results reported in Supporting 
Information, Table S3). While the pattern of effects is consistent 
with the pooled samples, we do note that the pooled results mask 
some differences between countries in terms of the magnitude of 
effects in the model. For example, the smallest indirect (and total) 
effect of perceived consensus on policy support was reported in 
the Spanish sample (βindirect = 0.08) and the largest in the US sample 
(βindirect = 0.41) with all other samples in the range of βs 0.14– 0.21.
2.3 | Interim discussion
Study 1 reveals that, across eight high- powered international 
samples, our primary hypothesis is supported: the perception of 
scientific consensus on COVID- 19 predicts support for relevant 
policies and these effects are mediated by worry over COVID- 19 
and personal belief that the pandemic represents a public health 
emergency. We do note some between- country variability in 
Path Label β b 95CI
Consensus → Agreement a1 0.50*** 0.02 [0.02, 
0.03]
Consensus → Worry a2 0.19*** 0.02 [0.01, 
0.02]
Agreement → Worry d 0.38*** 0.66 [0.62, 
0.70]
Agreement → WFH b1 0.29*** 0.57 [0.53, 
0.61]
Worry → WFH b2 0.15*** 0.18 [0.16, 0.19]
Consensus → WFH c 0.17*** 0.02 [0.02, 
0.02]
Combined indirect effect 0.20*** 0.02 [0.02, 
0.02]
Total effect 0.37*** 0.04 [0.03, 
0.04]
Note: WFH, support for work from home policy.
***p < .001.
TA B L E  2   COVID- 19 GBM path 
coefficients, indirect and total effect in 
pooled sample
Sample
Indirect effect Total effect
β b 95CI β b 95CI
Spain 0.08 0.01 [0.00, 0.02] 0.28 0.03 [0.03, 
0.04]
Ireland 0.14 0.01 [0.01, 0.01] 0.35 0.03 [0.02, 
0.03]
Mexico 0.16 0.02 [0.01, 0.02] 0.31 0.03 [0.03, 
0.04]
UK (Prolific; Apr) 0.19 0.02 [0.01, 0.02] 0.31 0.03 [0.02, 
0.04]
UK (Prolific; May) 0.21 0.02 [0.02, 0.03] 0.31 0.03 [0.03, 
0.04]
UK (Respondi; Apr) 0.22 0.02 [0.01, 0.02] 0.44 0.04 [0.03, 
0.04]
UK (Respondi; May) 0.21 0.02 [0.01, 0.02] 0.40 0.03 [0.03, 
0.04]
US 0.41 0.04 [0.03, 0.05] 0.49 0.05 [0.04, 
0.05]
Note: Indirect effect is the combined effect of consensus on policy support mediated via 
agreement and worry (i.e., three separate paths; see Figure 1). All effects are significant (i.e., 95% 
confidence intervals do not include zero).
TA B L E  3   Combined indirect and total 
effects of perceived consensus on policy 
support in individual samples
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the magnitude of the hypothesized indirect effect. Descriptive 
comparison of indirect effects across samples indicates that per-
ceived consensus is a stronger predictor of policy support in the 
US compared to other countries, with the smallest effect reported 
in Spain. Given the myriad differences between countries— both 
in terms of culture and pandemic response— it is difficult to pin-
point moderating factors. However, possible explanations for 
further investigation include country- level differences in defer-
ence to scientists regarding policy (Post et al., 2021) or variation 
in perceptions of the efficacy of government measures (Mækelæ 
et al., 2020). Purely as an example, it is possible that Spanish 
participants were more skeptical of the efficacy of a work from 
home policy and thus worry and perceived threat were not as 
strongly associated with support for this measure. While the cur-
rent study took advantage of multi- country data collection, it was 
not designed to identify country- level moderators. Further cross- 
cultural work is therefore needed to examine how effects in the 
GBM vary across different countries.
We must also acknowledge that the conclusions drawn from 
these results are necessarily limited by study's correlational nature; 
we cannot make any strong claims about the causal direction of 
these effects. In Study 2 we investigate the causal direction of ef-
fects by experimentally manipulating perceptions of consensus.
3  | STUDY 2
As a causal test of the GBM, we conducted a consensus messaging 
experiment following the design of van der Linden et al. (2019). In 
brief, we sought to confirm that experimentally induced changes in 
perceived consensus lead to changes in policy support, with these 
effects mediated by changes in worry over COVID- 19 and belief 
that the pandemic is an international emergency. Study 1 focused 
on government- mandated working from home as a policy support 
variable. In Study 2, we measure policy support using an index of 
support for a wider range of specific policies that were in place in 
the UK at the time of data collection. We also report an additional 
exploratory analysis investigating the moderating role of political 
ideology in the GBM, as interaction effects have been reported in 
the climate change domain (van der Linden et al., 2019). The study 
was pre- registered (https://aspre dicted.org/ka5sk.pdf).
3.1 | Methods
3.1.1 | Participants
Adult UK residents were recruited in September 2020 via Respondi 
and Prolific using interlocking quotas to ensure national samples 
matched to the UK population in terms of age and gender (and 
ethnicity in the case of Prolific; see Prolific, n.d.). All participants 
provided informed consent and were paid £1.25- £2.05. The study 
was overseen by the Psychology Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of Cambridge. A total of 1,856 participants took part in 
the experiment (938 via Prolific, 918 via Respondi; 51.7% female, 
Mage = 42.0, SD = 16.0; median education level: school education 
up to age 18; 81.8% white ethnicity). As per our pre- registration, 
127 participants (6.8%) who failed an attention check (“To make sure 
you are paying attention, please select 'Agree' for this statement”) were 
removed.
Like Study 1, the current experiment was embedded in a 
larger survey and thus the sample size was dictated by consid-
erations other than statistical power for the analyses presented 
here. However, using Fritz and MacKinnon's (2007) simulation 
study as a guide, the sample size is larger than that required to 
detect a mediated effect in which both a and b paths are “small” 
(by Cohen's standards of effect size; equivalent to β = 0.14) at 0.8 
power in analyses employing BCa bootstrap intervals as the test 
of the mediated effect (N = 462).
3.1.2 | Procedure
Participants completed the survey experiment on the Qualtrics plat-
form. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three experi-
mental conditions: control (n = 573), low (n = 583), and high (n = 573) 
consensus. Following van der Linden, Leiserowitz, et al. (2015), par-
ticipants first completed all pre- test measures before being asked to 
read a message reportedly drawn from a database of media state-
ments. In the high [low] message condition this statement read: Did 
you know? An estimated 97% [60%] of medical scientists agree that 
the COVID- 19 outbreak is a Public Health Emergency of International 
Concern. In the control condition participants read an unrelated con-
sensus statement: Did you know? An estimated 97% of dentists agree 
that that regular toothbrushing prevents tooth decay and cavities (see 
Goldberg, van der Linden, Ballew, et al., 2019). Following the manip-
ulation, participants completed a filler block of items asking where 
they had seen information about COVID- 19 (e.g., news media, social 
media) before completing all post- test items.
3.1.3 | Materials
Participants completed the following items before and after the 
experimental manipulation: perception of scientific agreement on 
COVID- 19 being a PHEIC, their own agreement with this claim and 
their level of worry over COVID- 19 (item wording identical to Study 
1). Participants also reported their support for four separate poli-
cies relating to COVID- 19 restrictions which were already in place 
in the UK at the time of data collection (Government of the United 
Kingdom, 2020) and aimed to reduce the introduction and transmis-
sion of the virus: nationwide lockdown in the event of a widespread 
second wave of infections; mandatory mask use on public transport and 
in indoor public spaces; mandatory 2- week self- quarantine for travel-
ers returning or arriving from countries with increasing infection rates; 
and, banning private gatherings of more than 6 people (except in certain 
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instances such as weddings) [all strongly oppose (1) to strongly support 
(7)]. Policy support was indexed as the average of these four items 
(pre- test α = 0.84; post- test α = 0.85).
Following the experiment, participants also reported their po-
litical ideology (1 = very liberal/left wing to 7 = very conservative/
rightwing; M = 3.59, SD = 1.38), and were recoded into three groups: 




Pre Post Post- pre
M SD M SD M SD
Consensus Low 80.43 18.62 67.32 14.99 −13.10 17.41
Control 82.11 17.40 82.52 17.47 0.45 6.11
High 83.11 16.33 91.51 12.87 8.39 12.58
Agreement Low 6.19 1.23 6.16 1.22 −0.04 0.76
Control 6.29 1.10 6.27 1.18 −0.02 0.72
High 6.30 1.09 6.41 1.02 0.11 0.67
Worry Low 5.29 1.73 5.33 1.76 0.04 0.70
Control 5.36 1.67 5.44 1.69 0.08 0.67
High 5.39 1.58 5.50 1.59 0.10 0.58
Policy support Low 5.72 1.38 5.76 1.41 0.04 0.37
Control 5.73 1.31 5.75 1.36 0.02 0.40
High 5.80 1.24 5.84 1.23 0.04 0.37
F I G U R E  2   Pre- and post- test means across experimental conditions for: perceived scientific consensus on COVID- 19 representing 
a PHEIC (a), personal agreement that COVID- 19 is a PHEIC (b), worry over COVID- 19 (c) and support for policies to limit the spread of 
COVID- 19 (d). Jittered points represent the underlying data distribution
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left- wing (responding 1– 3; n = 772), moderate (4; n = 555) and right- 
wing (5– 7; n = 398). Four participants with missing data for this item 
were excluded from relevant analyses.
3.2 | Results
Means and standard deviations for each variable before and after 
the experimental manipulation, and the difference between them, 
are shown in Table 4 and Figure 2.
Following from van der Linden et al. (2019), van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, et al. (2015), our test of the GBM focuses on individual- 
level change in key variables2 (see also, Linden, Leiserowitz, & 
Maibach, 2017). That is, each variable in the model represents the 
difference between pre- and post- treatment scores (see Table 4). 
Before reporting the results of path models, we first report the main 
effects of the experimental manipulation on such change (post- pre) 
in perceived consensus, agreement, worry, and policy support re-
sponses (Table 5).3 Briefly, all conditions differed significantly in 
terms of mean change in perceived consensus, and the mean change 
in reported personal agreement was significantly larger in the high 
consensus message condition compared to the low and control 
conditions.
These results show that reading a high (d = 0.80) or low consen-
sus message (d = 1.04), relative to a control message, significantly 
and substantially increases or decreases perceptions of scientific 
consensus regarding COVID- 19 representing a PHEIC. Reading a 
high consensus message also increases reported personal agree-
ment that COVID- 19 is a PHEIC (d = 0.20), compared to a low or 
control message.
While there were no main effects of experimental condition 
on worry or policy support, we note that tests of mediation have 
more power than the test of the total effect (Linden, Leiserowitz, 
& Maibach, 2017; O'Rourke & MacKinnon, 2015). On that basis we 
proceeded to examine the mediated effects of the experimental 
condition and changes in perceived consensus on policy support, 
via agreement and worry, using a structural equation modelling 
(SEM) approach. We reiterate that this was our pre- registered 
analysis.
3.2.1 | The impact of a high consensus message
We constructed a structural equation model reflecting the re-
lationships outlined by van der Linden et al. (2019): the read-
ing of a high consensus (vs. control) message predicts pre- post 
changes in perceived scientific consensus, which in turn pre-
dicts changes in policy support, with this effect mediated via 
shifts in personal agreement and worry (see Figure 3). This 
model fitted the pooled data well by conventional standards, 
X2(4) = 3.29, p = .510; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = 0.000 [0.000, 0.041]; 
SRMR = 0.014.
 2Before examining pre- post differences, we first fitted the cross- sectional model from 
Study 1 to pre- test responses. The results were consistent with Study 1 (see Supporting 
Information, Table S6).
 3We conducted one- way ANOVAs to examine the relationship between condition 
assignment and pre- test scores on all variables. There was a significant effect of 
condition on pre- test consensus estimates, F(2, 1724) = 3.45, p = .032, η2 = 0.004. 
Tukey's post hoc tests revealed a significant difference between the mean consensus 
estimates in the low and high conditions, with participants in the high consensus 
condition estimating, on average, slightly higher levels of scientific consensus prior to the 
manipulation (Mdiff = 2.45, p = .038, d = −0.14). No other significant differences were 
detected. As there was a significant difference between pre- test mean consensus 
estimates across experimental conditions, we also conducted a series of ANCOVA 
models examining the effect of condition on post- test scores for all variables, controlling 
for pretest estimates. The pattern of significant results was identical (see Supporting 
Information, Appendix 3).
TA B L E  5   Main effects of condition on post- pre difference scores and pairwise differences
Variable
ANOVA Post hoc
df F η2 Group 1 Group 2 Mdiff Cohen's d
Consensus (2,1795) 436.31*** 0.327 Low Control 13.55*** 1.04
Low High 21.50*** 1.42
Control High 7.95*** 0.80
Agreement (2,1797) 7.03*** 0.008 Low Control 0.01 0.02
Low High 0.14** 0.20
Control High 0.13** 0.19
Worry (2,1797) 1.42 0.002 Low Control 0.04 0.05
Low High 0.06 0.09
Control High 0.02 0.04
Policy support (2,1796) 0.28 0.000 Low Control −0.01 −0.04
Low High 0.00 0.01
Control High 0.02 0.05
Note: Tukey's post hoc test.
**p < .01; ***p < .001.
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Direct and indirect (i.e., mediated) effects are reported in 
Table 6. In line with prior research, we find that reading a mes-
sage outlining a high level of scientific consensus leads to sig-
nificant increases in perceptions of consensus, β = 0.374, 95%CI 
[0.330, 0.413]. These changes are associated with an increase in 
personal agreement, β = 0.139, [0.056, 0.236], which in turn pre-
dicts increases in support for related policies, β = 0.131 [0.025, 
0.246], resulting in a significant mediated effect of the consensus 
message on policy support via personal agreement with the con-
sensus position, βindirect = 0.007 [0.002, 0.018]. Put another way, 
message- induced increases in perceived consensus were associated 
with increases in personal agreement, which in turn were associ-
ated with increases in policy support. In unstandardized terms, the 
model indicates that reading a high consensus message (vs. con-
trol) leads to an eight percentage point increase in perceived scien-
tific consensus (b = 7.94 [6.82, 9.09]). Such a shift is associated with 
a 0.07 increase on the 1– 7 personal agreement scale (b = 0.009 
[0.003, 0.015]). An eight percentage point increase in perceived 
consensus is also associated with a 0.008 increase in policy sup-
port on the 1– 7 index, mediated via personal agreement (unstan-
dardized mediated effect of consensus on policy via agreement: 
b = 0.001 [0.000,0.001]). This effect, while statistically significant, 
can be considered small in practical terms, a point we will return 
to in the discussion. In contrast to results from the climate change 
domain (van der Linden et al., 2019), we find that experimentally 
induced changes in perceived consensus do not significantly pre-
dict change in worry over COVID- 19, nor does worry predict policy 
support.
As per our pre- registration, we also fitted a saturated model in 
which additional paths were specified: direct effects of the experi-
mental manipulation on all other variables in the model and a direct 
effect of perceived consensus on policy support. None of these 
additional paths were significant and all other effects were com-
parable to the results reported here (see Supporting Information, 
Appendix 5).
F I G U R E  3   Gateway Belief Model applied to COVID- 19 attitudes. Other than the experimental manipulation, variables in the model 
represent pre- post change scores. Standardized coefficients [95% confidence interval] shown; grey arrows indicate non- significant effects; 
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001
TA B L E  6   Direct and indirect effects of a high (vs. control) 
message and change in perceived consensus in the GBM
Effects Path β 95CI
Direct Exp → Con 0.374 [0.330, 0.413]
Con → Agree 0.139 [0.056, 0.236]
Agree → Worry 0.104 [0.036, 0.179]
Con → Worry −0.048 [−0.130, 0.011]
Agree → Policy 0.131 [0.025, 0.246]
Worry → Policy 0.039 [−0.033, 0.118]
Indirect Con → Agree → Policy 0.018 [0.006, 0.046]
Con → Worry →   
Policy
−0.002 [−0.011, 0.001]
Con → Agree →   
Worry → Policy
0.001 [0.000, 0.003]
Con total indirect 0.017 [0.003, 0.045]
Exp → Con → Agree →   
Policy
0.007 [0.002, 0.018]




Exp → Con → Agree →   
Worry → Policy
0.000 [0.000, 0.001]
Exp total indirect 0.006 [0.001, 0.017]
Note: Con, perceived scientific consensus; Exp, experimental 
manipulation. Bold values indicate bootstrapped 95% confidence 
intervals (BCa, 5,000 samples) does not include zero.
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3.2.2 | The impact of a low consensus message
When examining the impact of a low (vs. control) consensus mes-
sage, we find that our data again fits the mediation model outlined 
in Figure 3 well, X2(4) = 3.27, p = .513; CFI = 1.00; RMSEA = 0.000 
[0.000, 0.041]; SRMR = 0.01. Estimation of direct effects in the 
model revealed that exposure to a low consensus message sig-
nificantly predicted decreases in perceived consensus (β = −0.46, 
p < .001, 95% CI [−0.51, −0.41]), however changes in perceived 
consensus were not a significant predictor of change in personal 
agreement (β = 0.05, p = .10, 95% CI [−0.01, 11]) or worry (β = 0.02, 
p = .52, 95% CI [−0.04, −0.08]), and had no significant indirect ef-
fects on policy support (full results are reported in Supporting 
Information, Table S7).
3.2.3 | Exploratory moderation by political ideology
As previous studies in the climate domain have indicated that 
some effects in the GBM vary by political ideology (van der Linden 
et al., 2019), we examined political ideology as a moderator of the 
main effects of experimental condition on difference scores and 
path coefficients in the GBM path model. We found no evidence 
that political ideology moderates any reported effects (full results in 
Supporting information, Appendix 6).
4  | DISCUSSION
4.1 | Key findings
Across two studies we report correlational and experimental sup-
port for the GBM in the context of COVID- 19: Perceptions of sci-
entific consensus on the COVID- 19 threat are linked to personal 
agreement and worry about the issue (Study 1 only) which, in turn, 
are linked to support for specific policies aiming to control the 
spread of the virus.
Our Study 1 hypothesis was supported in all individual samples. 
Our experimental test of the model in Study 2 provided overall sup-
port for the model. In a large UK sample, experimentally induced 
increases in perceived scientific consensus regarding the threat 
posed by COVID- 19 predicted increases in personal agreement 
with the same claim, and this in turn predicted increases in support 
for policies that aim to restrict the spread of the virus. This result 
aligns with findings from the climate change domain (van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, et al., 2015; van der Linden et al., 2019) and suggests 
that communication of the scientific consensus has a role to play 
in garnering public support for policies to mitigate the spread of 
COVID- 19. The finding that people update their perceptions of the 
scientific consensus that COVID- 19 is a public health emergency— 
regardless of politics— is not trivial because it adds to a growing evi-
dence base that belief polarization is less likely to occur than initially 
thought (e.g., Guess & Coppock, 2020; Kuhn & Lao, 1996; Wood & 
Porter, 2019).
However, we did not find that changes in perceived consensus 
directly predict changes in worry over COVID- 19. We do find that 
worry is predicted by personal agreement, suggesting that the effect 
of consensus perceptions on worry is largely mediated via personal 
agreement. It is possible that this is due to the aligned wording of 
our consensus and agreement items which both specifically refer 
COVID- 19 representing a PHEIC, while the worry item captured 
overall worry over the virus.
The weaker effect (Study 1) or lack of an effect (Study 2) of worry 
on policy support also contrasts with results in the climate domain, 
where concern and worry over climate change are well- established 
predictors of support for climate policies (Bouman et al., 2020; Smith 
& Leiserowitz, 2014; van der Linden et al., 2019). However, in other 
policy domains the role of affective risk perceptions is less clear. For 
example, in the US following 9/11, worry and anxiety over terror-
ism was negatively associated with support for military initiatives 
and overseas engagement and did not significantly predict support 
for immigration controls (while perceived threat of terrorism was 
a positive predictor; Huddy et al., 2005). More research is needed 
to understand the role of affective risk perceptions, such as worry, 
and their relation to specific policies about COVID- 19. For example, 
research has shown that risk perceptions in general do correlate 
with people's self- reported compliance with public health guidelines 
(Dryhurst et al., 2020; Schneider et al., 2021).
We also find that experimentally induced decreases in perceived 
consensus do not have a subsequent impact on personal agreement 
or worry, and hence no indirect effect on policy support. While this is 
a positive finding for those concerned about actors undermining the 
scientific consensus, it does raise the question of how decreases in 
perceived consensus fit into the GBM. Our results in this regard align 
with the findings of Kerr and Wilson (2018) who reported that mes-
sages relating a high (97%) and low (63%) level of consensus among 
climate scientists had essentially equal but opposing effects on per-
ceived consensus (compared to a control group), however only the 
high consensus message had a significant indirect effect on personal 
belief in human- caused climate change mediated via shifts in per-
ceived consensus. Taken together these results raise the possibility 
that there is a non- linear relationship between numerical estimates 
of the existing level of scientific consensus and the subjective sense 
of agreement (see also Aklin & Urpelainen, 2014; Johnson, 2017).
4.2 | Implications
Our results provide the first empirical evidence that scientific con-
sensus information can shift COVID- 19 attitudes and, in turn, policy 
support. Thus, we find support for Van Bavel et al.'s (2020) sugges-
tion that consensus information could be used to build support for 
public health policies to minimize the impact of COVID- 19. In terms 
of applying the GBM in COVID- 19 communications, our experiment 
was a very conservative test of the model, examining the impact of 
a singular sentence on attitudes. This is reflected in the relatively 
small effect sizes reported for the main and indirect effects of the 
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experimental intervention. The current results are comparable to 
findings from consensus messaging studies in the climate domain. 
For example, van der Linden et al. (2019) report a d = 0.09 main 
effect of the consensus message on policy support. More broadly, 
a meta- analysis of climate messaging effects conducted by Rode 
et al. (2021) reports that policy attitudes are more difficult to ex-
perimentally shift than other climate- related attitudes. The pooled 
effect of expert consensus studies on climate attitudes (g = 0.09) 
was robust though relatively small, but in line with the meta- analytic 
effect size for all climate messaging interventions examined in the 
analysis (g = 0.08), from moral frames to psychological distance 
manipulations. In addition, messaging studies examining COVID- 19 
policy support have also reported limited effects. For example, 
Farjam et al. (2021) report that attributing policy interventions and 
their justification to a scientist has an no significant effect on sup-
port. However we would note that the main aim of the current study 
was not simply to shift policy support but to test the causal role of 
changes in perceived scientific consensus in policy attitudes, as out-
lined in the GBM. The very brief and simple nature of the messages 
used in Study 2 does make them very scalable via social and main-
stream media. The effects reported in the current study also result 
from just a single exposure. Implemented at scale small messaging 
effects can have a discernible impact on public opinion (see discus-
sion in: Landrum & Slater, 2020; Rode et al., 2021; van der Linden 
et al., 2019). More engaging and repeated consensus messaging 
campaigns incorporating visual elements or humor may prove more 
effective in shifting beliefs for those wanting to do so (Brewer & 
McKnight, 2017; Clarke et al., 2020; Goldberg, van der Linden et al., 
2020; Harris et al., 2019). Moreover, even when consensus messages 
do not directly shift policy support, they can still help counter the 
spread of misinformation (Maertens et al., 2020; van der Linden, 
Leiserowitz, Rosenthal, et al., 2017).
As mentioned, we did not find evidence of backfire or polariza-
tion effects. The “cultural cognition of scientific consensus” hypoth-
esis suggests that exposure to expert consensus cues on contested 
issues should polarize partisans further (Kahan et al., 2011). Although 
studies have noted an association between political ideology and 
COVID risk perceptions or policy support (Calvillo et al., 2020; Kerr 
et al., 2021; Mellon et al., 2021), we did not find political orienta-
tion to be a moderating factor in our experiment. This suggests that 
individuals across the political spectrum are equally influenced by 
COVID- 19 consensus messages. However, we must acknowledge 
that we cannot generalize this finding beyond the UK; it is possible 
that in countries with greater political polarization over COVID- 19 
mitigation policies, such as the US, political orientation might have 
a moderating influence. Further international research is required to 
confirm consensus messaging as a ‘politically neutral’ approach to 
COVID- 19 communications.
Our finding that decreases in perceived consensus did not pre-
dict a lack of policy support should not invite complacency regarding 
the publics’ perception of scientific opinion on COVID- 19. More di-
rect efforts to attack perceptions of scientific consensus on specific 
issues (e.g., COVID- 19 vaccine safety) could undermine support for 
COVID- 19 policies. Groups opposed to certain policies for ideolog-
ical or financial reasons may well seek to cast doubt on scientific 
consensus to weaken public support for those policies, as has been 
documented in relation to issues such as climate change and the 
carcinogenicity of tobacco (Diethelm & McKee, 2009; Oreskes & 
Conway, 2010).
Indeed in the US and UK, interest groups have cast aspersions 
on the science behind COVID- 19 claims (Ball, 2020). Russian Twitter 
bots have already spread information undermining the scientific 
consensus on vaccine efficacy (Broniatowski et al., 2018), and there 
is evidence that similar tactics are being used to undermine scien-
tific consensus regarding COVID- 19 (Marineau, 2020; Memon & 
Carley, 2020). Recent work on inoculation— warning individuals of 
disinformation strategies before exposure to misleading information— 
offers some hope for effective pre- bunking of efforts to undermine 
the scientific consensus (Cook et al., 2017; Lewandowsky & van der 
Linden, 2021). We also recognize that unlike other publicly debated 
scientific issues, such as vaccination and climate change, COVID- 19 
is a new and emerging issue. Thus, even where there is apparent sci-
entific consensus, the body of research upon which this is based may 
be limited and there is certainly capacity for the consensus position 
to change (see Martin et al., 2020).
4.3 | Strengths and limitations
Strengths of the current studies include the use of large, broadly 
representative samples from multiple countries (in Study 1) and a 
pre- registered experimental approach to test causal paths. However 
we must acknowledge some limitations. The use of single item meas-
ures for some constructs, though consistent with prior research (van 
der Linden et al., 2019), will have introduced measurement error into 
our models. Future researchers should consider the use of multi- 
item scales to better capture the constructs outlined in the GBM. 
The experiment was also embedded in a larger survey and preceded 
by question blocks which included other items on COVID- 19 risk 
perceptions and attitudes. Thus it is possible that these items primed 
responses in our experiment; however, any such effects would be 
consistent across conditions. Lastly, while our cross- sectional study 
reported consistent results across a number of countries, in two 
different languages, our experiment was only conducted with a 
UK sample and therefore we cannot be certain that these results 
will generalize to other contexts, particularly non- WEIRD (White, 
Educated, Industrialized, Rich, and Democratic; Henrich et al., 2010) 
samples.
4.4 | Conclusions
In conclusion, we offer correlational and experimental support for 
the GBM in the context of COVID- 19 attitudes: perceptions of sci-
entific consensus are tied to individuals' beliefs about the threat 
posed by the COVID- 19 virus and support for policies to limit the 
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spread of the virus. In agreement with previous research, we note an 
asymmetry in that increasing perceptions of consensus has a greater 
indirect effect on policy support than decreasing perceptions does 
in the opposite direction. Policy makers and public health commu-
nicators should be aware that the general public's idea of “whether 
scientists agree” has a significant impact on personal attitudes about 
the virus and subsequently on their support for related policies to 
curb its spread and impact.
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